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 In his article "Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner's 
Dilemma", John Carroll asserts that there are "only uncooperative equilibria in 
finitely, but infinitely, iterated games," and that this "calls into question 
the significance of the existence of cooperative equilibria in infinitely iterated 
Prisoner's Dilemma games."i  It is the purpose of this note to show that the claim 
is overstated for two reasons: (1) the iterated games he refers to are equivalent 
to finitely and definitely iterated games, of which it is well known that there 
are only uncooperative equilibria; and (2) his notion of an indefinitely iterated 
game is without any philosophical interest beyond that of the definitely iterated 
game. 
 The problem centers around Carroll's notion of an indefinite iteration, 
which he characterizes using what he calls a 'terminating p-function', defined 
as follows.   
p is a terminating p-function if and only if 
(1)    p(t) = 1, and  
(2) there exists a natural number ω such that  
(a) p(ω) > 0, and  
(b) for all natural numbers n > ω, p(n) = 0.ii 
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He tells us that we can think of p(t) as the probability that the game will be 
iterated t times.  Notice that according to this definition the game will not 
be played more than ω times, so that the sense in which the endgame is indefinite 
is that it might be played fewer than ω times.  Since there is an iteration which 
will be the last if the game is iterated even that long, it seems to us that it 
is not at all surprising that a form of the backwards induction proof that shows 
that there are only noncooperative equilibria in finitely repeated Prisoner's 
Dilemma (hereafter, PD) games would apply here, as Carroll demonstrates. 
 We will argue that the indefinite iteration to which Carroll refers is just 
equivalent to a finitely repeated game with a definite final iteration.  This 
would show what we claim, which is that Carroll's result is a trivial extension 
of an already well-known result.  The argument goes as follows.  Suppose we have 
the prisoner's dilemma of the following matrix: 
                                             
                                   player 2   
                                C          D          
                           ┌──────────┬──────────┐  
                           │          │          │  
                        C  │   x,x    │   z,y    │  
             player 1      ├──────────┼──────────┤  
                           │          │          │  
                        D  │   y,z    │   w,w    │  
                           └──────────┴──────────┘  
 
 Figure  1 
 
 
The payoffs are real numbers related as follows: y > x > w > z.  Carroll defines 
a function p*(t) to represent the probability that the game is iterated in period 
t+1.iii  Let <a,b> X i,t be the payoffs to player i in period t given that i plays 
supergame strategy a and the other player plays supergame strategy b. The iterated 
supergame payoff is then given by the sum of the payoffs in each game given the 
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strategy pairs of the players multiplied by the probability that they will be 
played: 
   p*(t-1) <a,b> X i,t   
Note that this is just equivalent to: 
(*)      p*(t-1) <a,b> X i,t ,     
since ω is the last period with a positive probability of being played.  The 
'[infinity sign]' is gratuitous here, and serves only to cloud the issue of whether 
the game is to be repeated finitely but indefinitely (i.e. with a finite upper 
bound on the number of possible iterations) or infinitely but indefinitely (that 
is, with no finite upper bound on the number of possible iterations).  Note also 
that the utility functions which Carroll is presupposing must be von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, since he assumes in writing the iterated 
game payoff functions this way that they have the expected utility property.iv 
 Finally note that Carroll seems to be supposing that the players have common 
knowledge of the iterated supergame, in particular, of ω, and of the players' 
rationality.v 
 The problem, then, is to find the strategies a and b such that equation 
(*) is maximized for each player, given the payoff matrix.  By the expected utility 
property, we can write the utility of a stochastic game as the utility for the 
same game played with certainty but with the payoffs multiplied by the probability 
of the game being played.  So the problem is equivalent to finding the strategies 
a and b which maximize the equation: 
    <a,b> X* i,t  
where X* represents the payoffs of the following matrices for each period: 
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                                   player 2   
                                C          D          
                           ┌──────────┬──────────┐  
                           │          │          │  
                        C  │p*(0)(x,x)│p*(0)(z,y)│  
             player 1      ├──────────┼──────────┤       Period 1 
                           │          │          │  
                        D  │p*(0)(y,z)│p*(0)(w,w)│  
                           └──────────┴──────────┘  
 
 
                                   player 2   
                                C          D          
                           ┌──────────┬──────────┐  
                           │          │          │  
                        C  │p*(1)(x,x)│p*(1)(z,y)│  
             player 1      ├──────────┼──────────┤        Period 2 
                           │          │          │  
                        D  │p*(1)(y,z)│p*(1)(w,w)│  
                           └──────────┴──────────┘  
 
. 
. 
. 
                                   player 2   
                                C          D          
                         ┌────────────┬────────────┐ 
                         │            │            │ 
                      C  │p*(ω-1)(x,x)│p*(ω-1)(z,y)│ 
             player 1    ├────────────┼────────────┤      Period ω 
                         │            │            │ 
                      D  │p*(ω-1)(y,z)│p*(ω-1)(w,w)│ 
                         └────────────┴────────────┘ 
 
 Figure 2 
 
Furthermore, since these are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, we can make a 
linear transformation to each matrix, which can be chosen for each matrix so that 
this supergame is equivalent to ω iterations of the original matrix, without 
changing the iterated game equilibrium strategy. (Just multiply the payoffs of 
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the kth matrix by 1/p*(k-1), which must exist, since by definition p*(k) > 0 for 
all 1 < k < ω.)  Thus Carroll's indefinitely iterated PD supergame is equivalent 
to the definitely finitely iterated PD supergame, and so it is no surprise to 
learn that it has only an uncooperative solution. 
 It is still an interesting question, however, whether situations of 
indefinitely repeated interaction should be modeled as finitely repeated games 
or as the standard sort of indefinitely repeated games.  We would like to conclude 
by giving a few reasons to think that the indefinitely repeated variety is better 
suited to the task of modeling a risky future.  The 'standard indefinitely iterated 
game', as we shall call it, is the game represented by Figure 1 repeated with 
probability d each time, so that the probability that the game will be repeated 
once (i.e. played twice) is d, (0 < d < 1), the probability that it will be repeated 
twice is d2, and in general, the probability that iteration t of the game, gt, 
 will be played is dt-1.  The difference between this and Carroll's finite but 
indefinitely iterated game is that the standard iterated game has a small but 
positive probability of continuing in any finite iteration.  But since it is indeed 
certain that we are all mortal, and thus face only finitely many iterations of 
any decision situation, Carroll claims that the iterated game with a definite 
upper bound on the number of iterations is a better model of reality.  He writes, 
"my definition of the iterated payoff is specifically designed to capture the 
finiteness of genuine iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas."vi  
 There are two problems with Carroll's claim.  First, as we have shown, the 
definiteness induced by the upper bound on the number of iterations in Carroll's 
game, (i.e. clause (ii) of his definition of the terminating p-function), 
overwhelms any indefiniteness in the model, and makes it equivalent to a finitely 
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and definitely iterated game.  That is, by introducing a definite endpoint Carroll 
has trivialized the indefinite nature of the iterations.  Second, in defining 
his terminating p-function as a finite sequence of probabilities which sum to 
1, (clause (i) of his definition), he has effectively fixed the conditional 
probability of future iterations of the game beyond ω.  In particular, the 
conditional probability of playing another game given that one is playing the 
ωth iteration is 0.  But is it realistic to suppose that one is usually, or perhaps 
ever, certain that the current interaction is the last one?  We think that it 
is more realistic to imagine that in any interaction there is a positive probability 
that one will experience another interaction; that's why it is a bad idea (unless 
it is a rationally chosen strategy to precommit yourself) to burn your bridges. 
 An analogy may make our point clearer.  Suppose Ethel lives longer than 
anyone has ever lived before, say 175 years.  We might imagine that a game theorist 
modeling PD iterations in life would set the probability of living 176 years at 
0.  But is it reasonable for Ethel to believe that it is certain that she will 
not live another year?  Given that she has lived 175 years, it seems to us that 
she would be justified in placing a positive, if small, probability on living 
another year.  The same point could be made, we believe, for any interaction 
situation -- it seems to us that it is normally unreasonable to believe with 
certainty that any particular interaction is the last of its kind.  Carroll claims 
that it is certain that we will not face a decision situation for millions of 
centuries, but in order to build this certainty in he must set an arbitrary upper 
bound on the number of iterations, and this is problematic for at least the last 
game.  The standard indefinitely iterated game, on the other hand, would place 
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a very small, vanishing to zero, probability on the chances of interactions continu-
ing for "millions of centuries". 
 An alternative approach, which captures the idea that the probability of 
continuing iterations of the game decreases with time, but doesn't require the 
conditional probability of the game continuing at any stage to be zero, is to 
let the probabilities decrease monotonically with time reaching zero only in the 
limit, if at all.  Let p'(t) be the probability that the game will be played t 
times, such that p' has two properties:  
(1') limitt->   p'(t) = [alpha],  1 > [alpha] > 0 , p'(t) monotonically decreasing; 
(2') 1 > p'(t) > 0. 
Notice that for p'(t) a constant 0 we have the one-shot PD, for p'(t) a constant 
1 we have the infinitely repeated PD, and for p'(t) we have the standard indefinitely 
repeated PD.  From the results of the standard indefinitely iterated PD we know 
that for [alpha] small enough (relative to w,x,y,z) there exists a finite iteration 
t* such that the probability of continuing is very close to [alpha] and it no 
longer pays the players to cooperate, and this is enough to begin the backwards 
induction to show that they will never cooperate for such an [alpha].  Thus for 
some such games Carroll's result would hold despite the potentially infinite 
iteration. 
 Of course, there may be artificial situations which are best modelled by 
the indefinitely finitely iterated PD, such as an Axelrod-type tournament in which 
an upper bound on the number of iterations has been set.  But these situations 
must be manufactured to have the definite upper bound; they are not naturally 
occurring.  And again, such games are equivalent to finitely repeated games. 
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Notes  
i. John Carroll, (1987), pp.255-6. 
ii. Ibid., p.249. 
iii. Carroll claims on p.251 that "p*(t) could be interpreted as the probability 
that game [t] will be played," but we take it that it should read 'p*(t-1)', given 
his definition of it in terms of p(t). 
iv. See John Harsanyi, (1977), p.33, for a discussion of utility functions and the 
expected utility property. 
v. See David Kreps, et.al., (1982), pp.245-252.  They show that there can be 
cooperative equilibria when there is not common knowledge of the players' options 
or motivation. 
vi. Carroll, op. cit., p.250. 
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